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ABSTRACT
The Effect of Fares on Transit Demand:
A Case Study of Atlanta, Georgia
by
Richard W. Prather
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning on- May 12, 1972
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of
Science.
Across the country transit fares have been steadily raising since 1950.
In Atlanta, this trend was recently reversed. The transit fare was
decreased from 40 cents to 15 cents. This thesis analyzes the effect
of fares on transit ridership. Atlanta is used as a case study to show
the general methodology available to evaluate fare changes.
By examining past studies, it is shown that transit demand is inelastic
to fare changes. Fare changes in other cities show that fare elasticity
differs by trip purpose, time of day, level of service, day of week and
economic level of the trip maker. Analysis of the methodology used in
Atlanta shows that better tools are needed to evaluate fare ckanges.
Thesis Supervisor: Ralph A. Gakenheimer
Title: Associate Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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Chapter I
Introduction
On November 9, 1972, the voters of metropolitan Atlanta narrowly
approved a one percent increase in the sales tax to finance a public
transportation system. The backbone of the system will be 50 miles of
rail rapid transit. Many political and business leaders consider this
system a key to the solution of Atlanta's transportation problems. In-
deed, many feel that unless a rail transit system is built, the region
will not continue to prosper. To them the question was not whether
Atlanta could afford to solve its transportation problems but whether
it could afford not to. Atlanta is faced with problems similar to
those of other major U.S. cities. They include increasing automobile
congestion, declining transit ridership, raising transit fares, in-
creasing air pollution, increasing demands for parking in the CBD and
the problems of mobility faced by the young, the old and the poor.
An immediate result of the referendum approval was a decrease in
transit fare from 40 cents to 15 cents on March 1, 1972. The 15 cent
fare .reflects a direct subsidy of operating costs. It is hoped that
the new system will be so attractive in reduced travel time and reduced
costs that many auto drivers will switch to transit and leave the ex-
pressways and major streets to those who must drive. This would de-
crease congestion and pollution while lessening the need to build more
highways and parking spaces downtown. Planners are also looking to the
new system to stimulate downtown activity and to revitalize the central
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city. In many cities the central business districts have declined as
population, employment and business activity moved from the central
city to the suburbs. It is hoped that the proposed transit system will
reverse this trend.
The citizens of Atlanta have very optimistic expectations of the
benefits of the transit system. A great deal of the optimism is based
on the hope that the system will be many more times attractive as the
present system because of improvements in service and the decrease in
fare. A fare reduction in a major U.S. city is very rare. In fact,
transit companies are under continuous pressure to raise fares because
of increasing costs and decreasing ridership. Fitch [1] points out
that transit operators have no short run economic incentive to keep
fares down and thereby maintain or increase passenger volumes. Short
run demand for transit service is such that fare increases normally in-
crease total revenues, in the short run, even though ridership declines.
Fitch [2] reports that the median cash transit fare went from 10 cents
in 1950 to 15 cents in 1955 and to 20 cents in 1961. The fare range
was 5-17 cents in 1950, and 10-30 cents in 1961. Between 1961 and 1972
fare increases have continued.
The objective of this thesis will be to analyze, on an exploratory
level, the effect of fares on transit ridership. Atlanta is used as a
case study to show the general methodology available to evaluate fare
changes. The scope of this thesis is not comprehensive at all. Time
and resources do not allow such a treatment of the topic. It is hoped
that the analysis presented shows the need for much more research in
this area. Chapter II summarizes the history of transit planning in
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Atlanta showing how the present fare structure was developed. In
Chapter III the effect of fares on transit demand is examined using
the results of past studies. Chapter IV shows the method of analysis
used in Atlanta to forecast transit demand. Conclusions and sugges-
tions of areas for further study are presented in Chapter V.
Chapter II
The History of Transit Planning in Atlanta
Prior Transit Plans
The concern for rapid transit transportation in Atlanta can be
traced back to 1954. In that year the Atlanta Region Metropolitan
Planning Commission (ARMPC) released its four county plan, Now for
Tomorrow. The following is an excerpt from that report:
Currently the citizens of the Atlanta area are dependent
on rubber tired buses to satisfy public transportation
needs. Within a few years, however, we will require some
type of high speed mass transportation to supplement the
bus system and serve our fast growing suburbs. [1]
In 1959, ARMPC released three more reports that dealt with trans-
portation. They were Crosstown and By-pass Expressways, Access to
Central Atlanta, and a report giving general facts on rapid transit. [2]
These culminated in the 1962 report Comprehensive Plan on Rapid Transit.
This report recommended short and long range rapid transit plans. The
basic design was a series of spokes and spurs radiating in all direc-
tions from a CBD transit center.
In 1962, the engineering firm of Parsons, Brinckerhoff, Quade and
Douglas (PBQD), under contract with the Metropolitan Atlanta Transit
Commission, examined the feasibility of a regional transit system.
PBQD recommended a system similar to the ARMPC proposal.
Favorable attitudes toward a transit system were growing rapidly.
In 1965 the Georgia legislature passed a bill authorizing a transit
district in the metropolitan Atlanta region. Also authorized was the
creation of the metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA).
-5-
MARTA was authorized to issue bonds, and to plan, construct, and
operate a transit system.
MARTA is a public agency. The governments of the four counties
and the city of Atlanta appoint its ten directors. MARTA has no taxing
power or eminent domain powers. The five governments approve MARTA's
budget and supply the local portions of MARTA funds to match state and
Federal grants.
In 1967, the firm of Parsons, Brinckerhoff-Tudor-Bechtel, (PBTB)
under contract with MARTA, updated the 1962 plan "to account for land
use, patronage, and other changes which took place during the five year
interval." [3] The new plan called for a 44 mile rail transit system
that would cost a total of $600 million. The construction of the system
required voter approval. In the fall of 1968 MARTA presented the PBTB
plan to the voters in a referendum. It was narrowly defeated. Most
observers attributed the defeat of the plan to its reliance on a pro-
perty tax increase, the uncertainty of Federal funding, the speed with
which it was developed and "sold" and the overwhelming opposition of
Atlanta's Black Community. [4]
The referendum's defeat forced Atlanta to re-evaluate its whole
transportation program. The Atlanta Area Transportation Study (AATS)
served as the medium for that re-evaluation. The AATS had been func-
tioning since 1962 as a planning element of the State Highway Depart-
ment. It began as a regional planning study administered by the Bureau
of Public Roads (now Federal Highway Administration). Its main con-
cern was estimating future needs for new highways.
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1967, the AATS was reconstituted as an informal regional trans-
portation planning body. Its new form included a policy committee
consisting of the heads of local governments (city and county), the
heads of the three agencies capable of providing transportation faci-
lities and services (the State Highway Department, MARTA, and the At-
lanta Transit System), and the Chairman of the Board of ARMPC. The
Policy Committee was supported by a Technical Coordinating Committee
which included technicians from all the participating agencies.
The first AATS regional transportation plan was unveiled in April,
1969. The plan included a $2 billion package of proposals for an en-
tire regional transportation system; including completion of the express-
way system, upgrading of major arterials, and a combined 66 mile rail-
busway system. The transit portion of this plan consisted of a $475
million program of rapid rail and busway construction. (A busway is
simply a bus operating on its own private right of way.) This in-
cluded 64 miles of private right of way routes, with 10 miles for rapid
rail and 54 miles for busways, and an expanded local and feeder bus
network. It was estimated that this system would carry 10 to 15 thou-
sand more passengers per day than would have been carried by MARTA's
1968 system. Its construction cost would have been 17% less than
MARTA's cost. Both systems served basically the same corridors. The
major difference was the AATS's systems heavy reliance on buses to
provide parts of the line-haul service.
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MARTA's 1971 Rapid Transit System
Figure 1
-8-
The Present Plan
By the Fall of 1969, MARTA had begun to question the technical
and political fleasibility of a busway system. The MARTA staff knew
of no busway system in operation at that time and were pessimistic of
the technical problems of building an "untried" system. At that time
many people in Atlanta considered busways second rate to rail rapid
transit. Therefore, it was reasoned, a busway system would-be harder
to sell in a referendum. These concerns caused MARTA to revise the
transit plans.
By November, 1971, MARTA was ready to present its transit plan
to the voters. MARTA's new system called for 56 miles of rapid rail
transit and 14 miles of rapid busways at a cost of $1.4 billion. The
corridors to be served were basically the same as the 1968 MARTA sys-
tem and the 1969 AATS system. The major difference from the 1968 sys-
tem was the use of busways and an expanded rail system. The referen-
dum narrowly passed in Fulton and DeKalb County but was defeated in
Clayton and Gwinnett County. The package that was approved by the
voters included the rapid transit plan, improved bus service, a one
percent sales tax and a 15 cent fare.
Development of the Fare Structure
It is difficult to document the origin of the idea for a 15 cent
fare structure. It appears that MARTA made reference to a "very low
fare of about 15 cents" in some of its public relations materials.
This figure remained in the public's mind. During the Summer of 1971
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a memo written by the Citizen's Transportation Adrisory Committee con-
tained the following:
It has been apparent for some time now that a number of
citizens expect that a flat rate of 15$ will be charged, at
least initially, for any transit service operated by the
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority. Readjusting
public sentiment on this starting fare appears to be extreme-
ly difficult. [5]
Also during that Summer, the Atlanta Coalition on Current Communi-
ty Affairs (a coalition of Black organizations) presented a list of
crucial issues to the MARTA board. [6] One of the key issues in that
list was a guarantee from MARTA that its objective was a 15 cents tran-
sit fare for 10 years. The board's reply to that issue was:
On June 7, 1971, the Board adopted a resolution specifying
a subsidized fare of 15 cents for the initial operation of
Atlanta Transit System. It was impractical then as now to
say with certainty how long such a fare could prevail, since
most of the related engineering and financial aspects are not
final. A decision on the fare will be made when the system
is adopted in August. For every dollar collected through fares,
three dollars will be available for construction assuming 2/3
Federal matching funds. The Board wishes to present a fare struc-
ture that will not constrict the solution of community trans-
portation problems. [7]
Thus, public pressure was on MARTA to have a 15 cent fare for as
long as possible. The fare structure that MARTA finally adopted was
a 15 cent fare (without transfer charges) for the first sevel years
and a 5 cent increase per year until the tenth year when the fare
would be"30 cents. Thereafter, the fare will be maintained at as low
a rate as possible considering all other relevant matters.
The range of fare structures existing today in America can be
grouped into three categories: [8]
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(1) Flat-fare plans where a uniform charge applies to any ride
within the service area.
(2) Zone-fare plans where the service area is divided into segments,
with the basic fare applicable to a one-zone ride and addi-
tional fare increments added for each subsequent zone tra-
versed.
(3) Point-to-point fare plans where individual fares are deter-
mined between each two points on the system, with the amount
of fare varying with the length of ride.
These three approaches are not mutually exclusive.
The decision on the fare- structure involved political and economic
issues. Remembering the 1968 referendum defeat, MARTA wanted to make
the transit package as attractive as possible. Politically, MARTA had
to develop a fare structure that would not cause defeat of the referen-
dum. The fare structure also had to be economically fleasible. It
would be foolish to set fares at a level so low that financing of a
viable transit system would be impossible. Therefore, an understand-
ing was needed of the effect of the fare structure on ridership and
revenues.
The adopted fare structure adequately addressed the political
issue; as evidenced by the successful referendum. The economic issues,
however, remains a bit fuzzy. The analysis done before the referendum
did not adequately consider the effect of the adopted fare structure
on transit ridership and revenues. More importantly, no analysis was
made of alternative fare structures. Realizing that public sentiment
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would be difficult to readjust concerning a 15 cent fare, the issue
became how long to maintain the 15 cent fare. Very little public dis-
cussion was given to issues like extra fares for long trips, zone fares
or reduced fares for short trips. No analysis was done on the effects
of such policies on ridership and revenues.
In order to develop a fare structure which would generate the
desired amount of revenue it is necessary to first understand how rider-
ship and revenue vary as fares are raised or lowered. The next chapter
examines the relationship between fares and transit demand.
Chapter III
The Effect of Fares on Transit Demand
Transit Demand
In order to identify the relationship between fares and transit
ridership, an understanding of transit demand is needed. The demand
for transit is dependent on the level of service provided by transit
and the level of service provided by competing modes of travel. For
transit, auto is the primary competing mode. Level of service is com-
posed of such things as out of pocket costs, waiting time, travel time,
walking distances, comfort and convenience. Transit demand is negatively
related to the cost and travel time of transit and positively related to
the cost and travel time of auto. Domencich, Kraft and Valette [1]
developed a model in which transit demand was a function of the number
of individuals in the origin zone and their socio-economic character-
istics, the level of activity and other relevant socio-economic and
land-use characteristics in the destination zone, together with the
travel times and costs of transit and auto. Thus, transit demand is
related to a wide range of explanatory variables.
In considering the effect of fare changes, the concept of demand
elasticity is useful. Demand elasticity is the percentage change in
the number of trips demanded for a given mode in response to a one per-
cent change in one of the explanatory variables, assuming all other ex-
planatory variables remain constant.
E f(R) = Elasticity of ridership _ R/R - f ? R
with respect to fare ~ f/f ~F
f = transit fare R = number of transit riders
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If the absolute value of E f(R) is less than one, then ridership is
inelastic with respect to changes in fare. Ridership is elastic with
respect to fares if the absolute value of E f(R) is greater than one.
Previous Studies
The relationship between fares and transit ridership has been
reported in several papers. [2] Kraft and Domencich [3] concluded
that transit demand is very inelastic with respect to changes in
fares. They report fare elasticities of -0.3 and -0.2 for shopping
and work trips respectively. Table 1 shows the results of fare
changes in fifteen cities. The elasticities range from- -0.08 to -. 40.
In each case, however, transit ridership is inelastic with respect to
fares. Three fare changes in Atlanta indicate elasticities of -. 28,
-.38 and -.40.
Work done by Carstens and Csanyi [4] helps to explain some of
the differences in fare elasticities among cities. They found in
their study of transit in Iowa that fare elasticity depends on the
level of service of the transit system. Annual revenue miles of tran-
sit service per service area resident was used as the measure of level
of service. Transit ridership tends to be more sensitive to fare
changes at low levels of service. At high levels of service they
found elasticities between -0.3 and -0.4 depending on the city size.
Several cities had quite low levels of service. Iowa City was one of
those cities. The fare there was decreased from a base fare of 25
cents to a uniform rate of 10 cents in 1966. Immediately transit
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Fare Changes
San Francisco
New York City
New York City (Bus)
Philadelphia
Boston (Surface)
(Rapid)
Chicago
Cincinnati
Portland
Connecticut Co.
Baltimore
Atlanta
Salt Lake City
New York City
Cincinnati
Chicago
Dayton
Pittsburgh
Atlanta
New York City
New Orleans
Kansas City
Atlanta
Date
June
July
Jan.
Jan.
Oct.
July
July
Feb.
June
Oct.
Oct.
Dec.
July
Dec.
Dec.
Jan.
Jan.
Aug.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
March
From To
1952 10 15
1953 10 15
1954 10 13
1954 15 18
1955 13 15
18-20 20
1957 20 25
1957 20 25
1958 20 25
1958 15 20
1958 20 25
1963 20 25
1963 20 25
1966 15 20
1968 25 30
1968 30 40
1969 25 -30
1969 30 35
1969 30 35
1970 20 30
1970 10 -15
1970 35 50
1972 40 15
% Fare
Change
+50
+50
+13.3
+20
+6.5
+9
+25
+25
+25
+33.3
+25
+25
+25
+33.3
+25
+33
+25
+16.7
+16.7
+50
*50
+43
-62.5
% Rider- Fare Elas-
ship Change ticity
-9.18 -.18
-10.0 -.20
-10.0 -.30
-2.8 -.14
- - -.19
-7.5
-6.0
-7.0
-9.3
-2.0
-7.0
-3.0
-6.0
-7.3
-6.1
-6.0
-5.5
-6.3
-4.7
-6.0
-13.2
+25.0
-. 30
-. 24
-. 28
-. 28
-. 08
-. 28
-. 12
-. 18
-. 29
-. 18
-. 12
-. 33
-. 38
-. 09
-. 12
-. 31
-. 40
Table 1
Transit Fare Changes
(Source: Curtin, John, "Effect of Fares on Transit Riding," 1968
and Arthur D. Little, Inc. "Financing Public Transportation," Sept. 1970)
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ridership nearly doubled and continued to increage gradually until the
ridership increase was more than 100% after the reduced fare had been
in effect for a year. The level of service had risen during that period.
Part of the ridership increase was possibly caused by the change in
service level. A comparison of ridership in the fourth quarters of
1965 and 1967 indicated an increase of 127% in ridership. Considering
the effect of the service change, the fare decrease of 48% caused a 98%
increase in ridership. That meant a fare elasticity of -2.0. Carstnes
and Csanyi explained that different service levels caused differences
in elasticities because many transit riders in Iowa had a choice of
travel mode and traveled by other means when faced with fare increases
on a system with low levels of service. Only when travel could be made
with shorter waiting times and reduced walking distances (implied by
high levels of service) was transit ridership fare inelastic.
In calculating the impact of a fare increase on the proposed BARTD
system, Curtin [5] reasoned that, because of the superior quality of
servi,ce and passenger amenities represented in rapid transit as com-
pared to existing forms of transit in San Francisco, the fare elasticity
for BARTD would be lower than that for existing routes and services.
This was based on the belief that passengers would be willing to pay
more for superior service.
Work done by Lassow [6] on the fare increase of 1966 in New York
City indicates that elasticities differ by trip purpose, time of day,
day of week, and economic level of the trip maker. Table 2 shows the
gross effects of the fare change. Table 3 shows the effects of the
fare change on subway ridership by tine of day.
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Gross Effects of Fare Change
Percentage loss of ridership
weekday
1.9
9.5
saturday
4.1
11.0
Elasticity of Ridership
weekday
-.06
-.28
saturday
-.12
-.32
Table 2
Subway travel is composed of a larger proportion of work trips
than bus travel. Thus the lower elasticities for subway ridership
agree with the results obtained by Kraft and Domencich, i.e., fare
elasticity for work trips is less than that for non-work trips. Bus
trips are shorter, less work oriented and may be more casual. This
suggests that bus travelers are more prone to eliminate trips or to sub-
stitute walking or taxi trips.
subways
buses
total
2.4
10.0
sunday
1.0
10
subways
buses
total
-.07
-. 3
sunday
-.03
-.3
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Effects by Time of Day
(subway only)
Time % Ridership Loss Elasticity
7 a.m. - 10 a.m. 2.4 -.06
10 a.m. - 4 p.m. 8.0 -.24
4 p.m. - 7 p.m. 5.0 -.15
7 p.m. - 11 p.m. 14.6 -.44
11 p.m. - 7 a.m. 3.7 -.11
Table 3
The different fare elasticities for different days of the week
indicate how elasticities vary by trip purpose. Saturday and Sunday
trips are generally more shopping, social and recreational oriented
trips. Thus the fare elasticities for these days are greater than
that for the weekdays. Sunday subway ridership was very inelastic.
Lassow speculated that Sunday subway riders were mainly workers in
service industries and round the clock operations and people travel-
ing for social and recreational purposes. Thus the small decrease in
ridership was due to the fact that the workers had to travel and the
others may not have had autos and were not deterred by the higher
fares because their trips may have been for special occasions and in-
volving long trips by the entire family. This was only speculation
since no data existed to offer any explanations.
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The peak periods had the lowest elasticitie?. The largest elasti-
city was for the evening hours which have the highest proportion of
social and recreation trips. The differences in elasticities for
time of day appear to be caused by differing proportions of trip pur-
poses.
The effect of the fare increase on lger income areas is given in
Table 4. A comparison with Table 3 shows that the impact of the fare
increase was greater for lower income areas.
Effects of Fare Change on Lower Income Areas
(subway only)
Time
7 a.m. - 10 a.m.
10 a.m. - 4 p.m.
4 p.nd. - 7 p.m.
7 p.m. - 11 p.m.
11 p.m. - 7 a.m.
% Ridership Loss
4.5
9.3
8.0
19.1
13.1
Elasticity
-. 13
-. 28
-. 24
-. 57
-. 39
Table 4
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Elastic vs. Inelastic
All of the studies indicate that transit ridership is inelastic
to fare changes. The transit industry's role of thumb is a fare elas-
ticity of -0.3. The distinction between elastic and inelastic demand
is important. If transit demand is elastic with respect to fares, then
a decrease in fare (without a change in service) will increase rider-
ship, and gross revenues. Net revenues may or may not increase de-
pending on the increase in costs caused by the additional riders. An
increase in fare will decrease ridership, gross revenues, and net reve-
nutes. If, however, transit demand is inelastic with respect to fares,
then an increase in fare (without a change in service) will increase
the gross and net revenues but decrease ridership. A decrease in fares
will increase ridership but decrease gross and net revenues. The size
of the demand elasticity is therefore important in determining the finan-
cial effect of a fare change on the transit system. The three fare
changes shown for Atlanta in Table 1 all indicate inelastic demand.
The Atlanta Fare Reduction [6]
The 1972 reduction applied to about 83% of the systems riders.
The remaining 17% use special services, such as school buses, and their
fares remained the same. There was a 25% increase in ridership, after
one week, in the group receiving the fare reduction. Overall there was
an 18.5% increase in ridership. The increase was enough to warrant pur-
chase of 20 used buses to meet emergency conditions of overcrowding on
some routes.
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Further analysis by MARTA indicates that a substantial increase
in riders has occurred during off-peak hours and on weekends and that
a significant increase in short distance riding has occurred. The
peak period increase was 5 to 6%; indicating an elasticity of about
-0.08. MARTA attributes the small increase in peak hour riders to
the uncertainty of the continuation of the 15 cent fare. (Until a court
case is settled it is uncertain how long MARTA can maintain-the 15 cent
fare.) It is reasoned that commuters are not willing to give up park-
ing spaces or car pool arrangements until the lower fare is permanently
established. The significant increase in short distance riding supports
the theory that many potential riders prefer to walk limited distances
rather than use transit if fares are relatively high. Also, the differ-
ence between transit fares and taxi fares is not substantial for short
trips, especially when two or more people are traveling together.
The work done by Kraft and Domencich suggests that most of the
increase in peak hour transit work trips is diverted from automobile
travel. For non-work trips, however, there is little diversion from
autos. Most of these additional transit trips are induced trips. The
fare -reduction probably caused people to increase their total number
of non-work trips. It is unlikely that a fare reduction could cause
people to increase their total number of work trips.
Except for Atlanta and Iowa City, all of the fare changes involved
increases in the fare. Most people implicitly assume that for a given
city, if the fare is increased or decreased by X percent, then rider-
ship will decrease or increase by y percent. It is not intuitively
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obvious that the fare elasticity for fare increases is the same as the
one for fare decreases. The public may react both qualitatively and
quantitatively different in each case. This question needs to be con-
sidered further.
As pointed out earlier, the issue that MARTA had to resolve was
the length of time to maintain the 15 cent fare. The main criteria for
determining this would appear to be the amount of revenue estimated for
future years. The next chapter examines the methodology used by MARTA
to estimate future ridership and revenues. Both have been shown to be
sensitive to the fare elasticity.
Chapter IV
MARTA's Methodology
Traditional Approaches to Transit Demand Estimation
Before outlining the methodology used by MARTA, it is useful to
discuss the traditional approaches used to estimate transit demand.
Many traditional techniques for estimating transit demand exist.
Generally, they can be grouped into the following diversions:
1. Direct generation of transit trips
2. Modal split
a) Trip-end models
b) Trip-interchange models.
Direct Generation [1]
The direct generation approach involves estimating transit trips
directly from basic factors such as automobile ownership and residen-
tial density. This method has been used by small urban area transporta-
tion studies. Transit person trips are generated directly either with
total person trips or auto driver trips by purpose. If total person
trips are generated, automobile occupancy factors can be used to con-
vert the person trips not using transit into auto driver trips. The
transit and the auto-driver trips can then be distributed and assigned.
There is no way to assess the impact of changes in transit usage on
the number of auto trips if auto-driver trips are generated instead of
total person trips because each is forecast independently. This
approach would be justified for a small urban area having little transit
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usage at present and in the forecast year. This technique ignores
the question of the relative cost of transit versus automobile trips.
(See Figure 2.)
Modal Split [2]
The modal split method of approaching transit demand focuses on
the division of trips between competing modes of transportation. The
techniques under this approach all presuppose some independent tech-
nique of estimating the total number of trips that will be made by all
modes in the system.
Trip-End Models
Trip-end or predistribution models estimate the proportion of
total person trips by transit before trip distribution. Automobile
occupancy factors are applied to the auto person trips to produce auto-
driver trips. The transit and auto-driver trips ends are then distri-
buted and assigned. Assignment is independent, i.e., transit trips are
assigned using only the transit network and auto trips are assigned
using only the highway network. (Figure 3)
Trip-end models usually make primary use of the characteristics
of the trip makers and their residence zones. These models are forced
to rely on weak service measures because the most effective measures
of transit service are related to the specific zonal interchanges which
are not calculated at the time of the split.
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In summary, a trip-end model uses socio-economic characteristics
and, sometimes, a general accessibility index to the region as a whole,
to explain choice of mode. These models are strongly tied to existing
and historic transit service levels. Trip-end mode split models were
developed in the earliest transportation studies where the main objec-
tive was the prediction of and planning for highway transportation.
Trip-Interchange Models
Trip-interchange or post distribution models allocate the trips
among the various modes after trip distribution. The theory underlying
this model is that the total number of people moving between an origin
and a destination zone make up a travel market. The available modes
complete for the market and, depending on their relative competitive
position, obtain a portion of it.
Total person trips are generated by purpose and distributed,
usually on the highway network. Next, the modal split model is applied
to determine the proportion of each trip interchange that will occur by
transit. Auto occupancy factors are applied to the auto person trips.
The transit and auto-driver trips are then assigned to their respective
networks.
Trip-interchange models allow better reflection of the effects of
transit service differentials that exist between different trip inter-
changes. It uses socio-economic characteristics and accessibility
measures between specific zonal pairs.
-25-
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Transit
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Figure 2
Generalized Diagram of the Direct Generation
of Transit Trips Approach
(Source: Weiner, Edward, "Modal Split Revisited" in Traffic Quarterly,
January, 1969)
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Generalized Diagram of a Trip-end Modal Split Model
(Source: Fertal, M.J. et al: Modal Split; Documentation of Nine
Methods for estimating Transit Usage, U.S.B.P.R., December, 1966, p.6)
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Trip-interchange models were developed as planners began to recog-
nize the important of public transportation in urban travel. These
models are more sensitive to characteristics of the transportation
system. In addition, the trip-interchange sequence appears to be more
realistic than the trip-end sequence. (See Figure 4.)
The Atlanta Modal Split Model
The modal split model used by MARTA was developed in 1968 by
Alan Voorhees and Associates for the AATS. [3] It was a trip inter-
change model. Previously, the AATS had used a trip-end model. A new
model was developed because "the mode choice model developed by the
AATS staff had been intended for more generalized estimates of future
transit usage in the context of future highway planning. Use of the
model to test alternative transit systems was not envisioned." [4]
The interchange model consisted of a set of diversion curves.
The variables used in the model are: average family income, employ-
ment density, and equivalent travel time differences ([transit line
haul time - highway line haul time] + 2.5 [transit excess time - high-
way excess time]). There are four levels of employment density, nine
ranges of family income and ten classes of equivalent travel time
differences. (See Table 5.) The trip purposes used in the modal are
home based work, home based other and non-home based. Figure 5 is an
example of the curves.
By use of past travel surveys, mode choice percentages were found
for each cell defined by the four levels of employment density, nine
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Generalized Diagram of a Trip Interchange Modal Split Model
(Source: Fertal, M.J. et al: Modal Split; Documentation of Nine
Methods for Estimating Transit Usage, U.S.B.P.R., December, 1966, p.76)
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ranges of family incomes, and ten classes of equivalent travel time
differences. There are 360 different cells. The mode choice program
reads the input trip tables, the values of the input variables for the
trip interchanges and selects the percent transit relevant to the
particular interchange.
The major weakness of the model in the context of this thesis is
the absence of any measure of the relative cost of transit versus auto
trips. The explanation for this omission is given in the report. [5]
Running time differences and cost differences were shown to
be of only marginal significance by the preliminary regression
analysis. In the case of running time differences, this is
primarily because bus speeds are fairly constant-throughout
the urban area and quite low compared to auto speeds, hence,
there is very little variance in transit usage with respect
to running time holding all other factors constant. The same
reasoning may be applied to cost differences. It should be
noted that the cost difference employed here does not include
parking cost since 1961 parking cost data was unavailable.
This is a serious deficiency as parking cost is typically one of
the most significant factors in mode split. The strong showing
of employment density is almost surely due to the high corre-
lation of parking cost with employment density -- employment
density is, in effect, a surro-gate for parking cost. In spite
of the poor showing of running time differences and cost dif-
ferences, it is essential that running time differences be in-
cluded in some way and desirable that cost differences be in-
cluded. Running time difference is essential to the evaluation
of alternative transit systems which have different operating
speed characteristics. Inclusion of cost differences would
permit study of alternative fare structures at some future
date. (emphasis added)
At the time of development of the model, there was not an im-
portant reason to include cost variables since changes in fare
structure were not a part of any of the transit proposals. In 1971,
however, this omission was crucial since changes in fare structure
were important parts of the transit analysis. What effect would the
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Gross Employment
Density
(persons/gross acre)
0.00 - 1.00
1.01 - 6.50
6.51 - 25.00
25.01 - 99.00
Variable Strata
Average Family
Income
(Dollars)
- 3,000
3,001 - 4,000
4,001 - 5,000
5,001 - 6,000
6,001 - 7,000
7,001 - 8,000
8,001 - 8,000
10,001 - 12,000
12,001 - 99,000
Equivalent Time
Differences
(in minutes)
- 0.0
1.00 - 10.00
11.00 - 20.00
21.00 - 30.00
31.00 - 40.00
41.00 - 50.00
51.00 - 60.00
61.00 - 70.00
71.00 - 80.00
81.00 - 990.00
Table 5
various fare structures have on ridership? This question was im-
possible to answer using only the modal split model for analysis.
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MARTA's Analysis
Since the modal split model used by MARTA was totally insensitive
to cost differences between transit and auto travel, one would suspect
that MARTA adjusted the results of the modal split analysis to account
for the fare reduction. Unfortunately, this was not done.
Transit estimates were done for the years 1983 and 1995. The
total travel demand in 1983 for each trip purpose was taken exactly
as estimated by the AATS. The transit share of the trips for 1983 was
determined by applying the modal split model to the total 1983 travel
demand. Transit travel times were determined from the assumed 1983
transit network and auto travel times were obtained from the proposed
AATS regional highway system for that year. The 1983 socio-economic
forecasts used were developed by ARMPC. Line and station loads were
obtained by assigning transit trips to the assumed 1983 transit net-
work.
A somewhat different process was used to forecast 1995 transit
trips. First, the modal split model was applied to the total 1983
travel demand under 1995 transportation system and socio-economic con-
ditions. The figure obtained, it was reasoned, depicted a transit de-
mand at the 1983 absolute volume level, but under the relative trans-
portation and socio-economic conditions estimated for the region in
1995. The Fratar method was then used to produce the actual transit
trips for 1995 (i.e., the figures were factored by the growth in em-
ployment and population of each zone that was estimated to occur be-
tween 1983 and 1995). Figure 6 shows the process used for 1983 and
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1995. Once estimates were obtained for 1983 and 1995, estimates of
patronage were made for intervening years within the span of. the finan-
cing plan. These interpolated figures formed the basis of the annual
fare revenue estimates. The figures were not adjusted to reflect the
anticipated effects of the fare reduction. Table 6 shows the un-
adjusted results for 1983.
Travel by Mode and Purpose, 1983
(Daily Weekday Trips)
Trip Purpose Transit Trips % Auto Trips % Total Trips
Home-based work 204,743 17.17 987,709 82.83 1,192,452
Home-based school 14,607 12.54 101,832 87.46 116,439
Home-based other 106,787 3.59 2,869,023 96.41 2,975,810
Non-home based 24,414 3.57 660,192 96.43 684,606
Total Trips 350,551 7.05 4,618,756
Table 6
As Chapter III indicated, a fare reduction would cause an increase
in the total number of transit trips. The amount of increase would
vary by trip purpose, time of day, day of week and economic level of
the trip maker. In order to do micro level planning, such as station,
it will be necessary for MARTA to consider the changes in travel that
will occur. Inadequate facilities may result if this is not done.
92.95 4,969,307
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The continuing phase of planning in Atlanta will require estimates
on line and station loads. Those that presently existed are based on
the modal split analysis that did not incorporate the cost differences
between transit and auto. They underestimate the actual loads. The
results of the New York City fare change show that use of a constant
fare elasticity in adjusting the figures will be misleading. If the
fare change in Atlanta was monitored extensively, it may be possible
to estimate the fare elasticity as it varies by trip purpose, by time
of day, by economic levels and by length of trip. Such information
would add greatly to the reliability of the projected ridership.
Chapter V
Conclusion
Fares are perhaps the most sensitive aspects of a
transit system, reflecting a balance between political
considerations and the need for operating revenues. [1]
MARTA's experience clearly indicates that alternative fare struc-
tures have to be considered first from the standpoint of public accept-
ance and policy considerations and then evaluated to determine their
effect on transit ridership and revenues. In Atlanta, public sentiment
appeared very strongly in favor of a 15 cent flat fare. Proposals for
higher fares or different structures may have caused defeat of the re-
ferendum. Given that the fare would be 15 cents, the issue that MARTA
faced was how long to maintain the fare at that level. The fare plan
proposed by MARTA was not based on analysis. It was rather, a com-
promise between those groups that wanted a 15 cent fare for 10 years
and those groups that wanted it only for a short time span. It was a
political decision with limited analysis.
A better evaluation of the effect of the adopted fare structure
on ridership and revenues probably would not have affected the out-
come significantly. The crucial obstacle that MARTA had to overcome
was public acceptance. Since the 1968 referendum, a feeling of dis-
trust had existed among many portions of the public toward MARTA.
During the summer of 1971, there was the feeling among some people that
MARTA was misinforming and misleading the public on many important
issues in order to make the proposed transit system more attractive.
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In such an atmosphere the public was not willing to accept the
professional judgement of the MARTA staff without question. This made
it even more difficult to readjust public sentiment on the starting
fare, even if there were valid reasons for starting at a higher fare.
Thus, better understanding of the fare elasticity would have enabled
MARTA to make better estimates of future revenues but it would not have
allowed them to make significant changes in the fare structure. Since
the transit plan had to be approved by the voters, MARTA's ability to
develop alternative fare structures was limited. The power of the vote
forced the adopted fare structure to be based greatly on political
fleasibility. Had voter approval not been required, I am sure that a
different fare structure would have been adopted. I am not sure, how-
ever, whether a better analysis would have been made.
Evaluation of Fare Structures
The use of a constant fare elasticity by the transit industry is
adequate for gross predictions but may be misleading for line and sta-
tion analysis. Past studies and recent experience in Atlanta indicate
that the elasticity of transit ridership with respect to fare varies by
trip purpose, time of day, level of service, day of week, length of
trip and economic level of the trip maker.
The present framework for doing modal split analysis does not
permit adequate evaluation of alternative fare structures. In Atlanta,
the absence of a cost variable made the model totally insensitive to
cost differences between auto and transit. Even when a cost variable
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is included in a modal split model there are still problems. Model
split models are calibrated with data on existing and past trends.
In most cases, the range of cost data is too narrow to permit in-
ferences to be made with any reliability as to the effects of alterna-
tive fare structures. Extrapolation out of the range of the data would
be required.
Modal split models are concerned with the diversion of auto trips
to transit. The aggregate models commonly used predict the percentage
of total daily trips that will be made by transit for each set of trip
interchanges. Modal split is determined independent of the total number
of trips, which is determined independent of supply characteristics
such as the price of the trip. The result is that the models do not
account for induced trips that occur when fare is lowered or trips
that are not made when transit fare is raised.
The choice of when to travel is not reflected in modal split
models. The problem is that there is an absence of data or reliable
estimates of the price cross-elasticity between peak and off-peak
travel. The division of trips between rail transit and bus is over-
looked by modal split models. This issue becomes important when the
price of the two services differ. Thus modal split models allow only
a limited analysis of fare structures.
If public acceptance and policy considerations can be overcome,
a wide range of fare structures is available to transit companies.
Most would be modifications of differentiation based on distance and
differentiation between peak and off-peak service. With automatic
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fare collection techniques as proposed for the San Francisco BARTD sys-
tem there is even greater opportunity to apply varying fare structures.
The proposed system for BARTD involves using tickets that have electric
charges stored on them. [2] Each time a ticket is inserted into an
automatic turnstile, some of the charge can be removed. This kind of
system can allow different rates to be charged for different times of
the day and for different length trips. Technically, devices that will
allow more variations in pricing will be available in the future. It
is difficult, however, to say what the political fleasibility of the
variations will be in the future.
Because of the limitations of conventional modal split models,
new techniques need to be developed to evaluate fare structures. The
development of such tools requires a better understanding of the effects
of fares on transit ridership. Particularly important is more analysis
of the difference in elasticity by trip purpose, time of day, level of
service, day of week and economic level of the trip maker. Without
such information, transit companies will remain reluctant to trying
new and innovative ideas in transit pricing.
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